

OFFICIAL INFORMATIONCONFIDENTIAL**EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 1040
INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE**

DATE: September 9, 2020

TO: Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

FROM: Inspector General

SUBJECT: OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTING 050-19 FOR 9/15/20 CLOSED-SESSION AGENDA

Division	Date	Time	Duty-On (X) Off ()	Uniform-Yes (X) No ()
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Hollenbeck	10/22/19	9:39 p.m.		
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Officer(s) Involved in Use of Force	Length of Service
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Carbajal, J./PO III	11 years, 4 months
Bravo, M./PO II	17 years, 7 months
Meraz, M./PO II	2 years, 6 months

Total Involved Officer(s)

1 x Sgt. II
1 x Sgt. I
1 x PO III
2 x PO II

Suspect	Deceased ()	Wounded ()	Non-Hit (X)
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Rodolfo Louis Coleman: Male Hispanic, 29 years of age.

COP Recommendations

Tactics – Tactical Debrief, Sergeants Covarrubias and Grant, along with Officers Meraz, Bravo and Carbajal.

Drawing/Exhibiting – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers Meraz, Bravo and Carbajal.

Lethal Use of Force – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers Meraz, Bravo and Carbajal.

IG Recommendations

Tactics – Same as COP.

Drawing/Exhibiting – Same as COP.

Lethal Use of Force – Same as COP.

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INVESTIGATION

Annotated Force Investigation Division (FID) Incident Summary¹

Synopsis

On Tuesday, October 22, 2019, at approximately 2139 hours, uniformed officers assigned to the Hollenbeck Area Special Problems Unit (SPU) were searching the area of Glass Street and 1st Street for a possible murder suspect. As the officers were driving through the area, they observed the male suspect standing on the sidewalk. As they neared the suspect, he suddenly fired multiple gunshots at them resulting in an Officer-Involved Shooting (OIS). The suspect fled the scene, a large perimeter was established, and an extensive K-9 search was conducted. The suspect evaded capture but was located and arrested two days later.

Investigative Summary

On October 22, 2019, at approximately 1250 hours, an unidentified male citizen called the detective desk at Hollenbeck station indicating he wanted to provide information on the identity of a murder suspect. Detective II James Yoshida, Serial No. 30133, Hollenbeck Homicide, took the call. While speaking with the individual, Yoshida learned the citizen wished to remain anonymous and declined to provide the detective with his phone number.² The unidentified caller told Detective Yoshida he did not witness the homicide, but overheard a known gang member from “The Mob Crew” (TMC) bragging about a murder he had committed. The caller then identified the gang member as “Rudy” and added that he was also known as “Maniac and Yak.” The caller also provided Rudy’s physical descriptors (age, height, weight, distinctive tattoos, etc.). During their conversation, it became apparent to Detective Yoshida that the caller was referring to a homicide that occurred in a homeless encampment on October 21, 2019, in the 100 block of Myers Street underneath the 1st Street Bridge.

Detective Yoshida provided the citizen with his cellphone number and asked him to call back if he received additional information. Utilizing the information received during the call, Detective Yoshida queried Los Angeles Police Department and the State of California computer databases and identified Rudy as Rodolfo Louis Coleman, 29 years of age.

¹ The Incident Summary presented here is reproduced from FID’s report regarding this case, and is supplemented with annotations by the OIG. All OIG annotations are referenced as an “OIG Note.” All other references and citations in the reproduced FID Incident Summary (e.g., Investigators’ Notes or Addenda Items) are reproduced directly from FID’s report. Unless otherwise stated, all information provided in OIG annotations is derived from FID’s investigation of this incident.

² The unidentified citizen advised Detective Yoshida he could refer to him as, “Lawrence.” However, the caller’s identity was never verified.

Detective Yoshida forwarded this information to Police Officer III Steve Megliorino, Serial No. 40050, Hollenbeck Homicide. As Yoshida's shift was ending, he requested that Officer Megliorino continue to gather whatever information he could on Coleman. At approximately 1920 hours, Detective Yoshida was at his residence when he received an additional phone call from "Lawrence." Although the call came from a blocked number, Yoshida also received a text from Lawrence. The phone number on the text was not blocked. Detective Yoshida stated, *"I have his number, so he's no longer an anonymous citizen in my mind. He still wouldn't give his name."³...Now it's a trusted source, or at least a source that's giving specific information. And he's not anonymous because I can call him back."*⁴

According to Detective Yoshida, Lawrence provided him with information about Coleman including that *"He's banging on people."⁵ He's got his gun. I think that's his gun. And he's wearing a black fanny pack and he's right here there at the fence line at 1st Street and Gless Street."*⁶

Lawrence described Coleman as wearing a red baseball cap worn backwards, a gray hoody sweat top, a black fanny pack, gray Nike shorts and shoes and white knee-high socks. Even though Detective Yoshida had not met with Lawrence, he believed he was providing specific and actionable information to warrant police response. He equated the information to that received from a citizen calling 911 and reporting a man with a gun (Addendum No. 1).

Based on the specific information Lawrence was providing, Detective Yoshida decided to call Sergeant I Jose Covarrubias, Serial No. 35443, Unit 4Q20, Hollenbeck SPU, and ask Covarrubias for his unit's assistance. Detective Yoshida's goal was to work with SPU to safely coordinate a police response with adequate resources to the area of 1st Street and Gless Street, near Pecan Park, to look for Coleman and arrest him on the open gun charge.

Sergeant Covarrubias stated, *"He [Yoshida] tells me that he's getting a real time -- he's getting real time information. Basically, somebody called him and advised him that there was a 415 man with a gun over at Pecan Park. The person -- the citizen who called him advised him that the that suspect was bragging that he had committed a murder. He had given Detective Yoshida, I guess, the physical descriptors on the suspect. The -- coincidently, Detective Yoshida's investigation for that murder was kind*

³ Yoshida, Page 11, Lines 18-20.

⁴ *Id.*, Page 14, Lines 3-5.

⁵ *"Banging on people"* is street vernacular for gang members harassing citizens and asking them where they are from and displaying gang signs.

⁶ Yoshida, Page 12, Lines 1-4.

of leading towards a particular suspect or at least that's what they're, you know, I -- I think he had gotten an anonymous tip or something.”⁷

In response to Detective Yoshida's request, Sergeant Covarrubias directed his unit to meet at Hollenbeck station. He then provided them with Coleman's clothing description, criminal history and photograph. They formulated a plan and then notified Sergeant II Ernesto De Alba, Serial No. 31350, Assistant Watch Commander, Hollenbeck Patrol Division.

OIG Note No. 1: The plan that was formulated was communicated amongst the involved officers verbally (as opposed to being communicated via a written operations plan).

The following police personnel were present and received the information pertaining to Coleman:

Hollenbeck Area SPU:

- Police Officer III Jose Carbajal, Serial No. 39480, Police Officers II Michael Meraz Serial No. 42991, and Mark Bravo, Serial No. 36154, Unit 4Q24;⁸
- Police Officers II Michael Malone, Serial No. 42698, and Adam Mott, Serial No. 42551, Unit 4Q26;

Hollenbeck Patrol Division:

- Police Officer III Gabriel Blanco, Serial No. 36365, and Police Officer II Hector Almeda, Serial No. 39529, Unit 4A53;
- Police Officer III Richard Wilson, Serial No. 39076, and Police Officer I Victor Castillo, Serial No. 43929, Unit 4A9;

Officer Carbajal called Detective II Adrian Parga, Serial No. 27946, Hollenbeck Narcotics Enforcement Detail (NED), and requested their assistance. According to Sergeant Covarrubias, the plan was to have officers in a plain vehicle drive to the area of Pecan Recreational Center, located at 1st Street and Gless Street, to look for Coleman. The remaining team members were to stage nearby. If Coleman was seen, the observing officers would communicate their observations via radio to the standby team who then would respond to the location and detain him. Sergeant Covarrubias

⁷ Covarrubias, Page 12, Lines 10-25.

⁸ Officer Carbajal, 11 years, four months with the Department, 42 years of age, five feet, five inches tall, 165 pounds. Officer Meraz, two years, six months with the Department, 25 years of age, five feet, nine inches tall, 165 pounds. Officer Bravo, 17 years, seven months with the Department, 39 years of age, five feet, seven inches tall, 155 pounds. Officers Carbajal, Meraz and Bravo were wearing their ballistic vests and had their Department-approved handguns, handcuffs, canisters of Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray, TASERs and Hobble Restraint Devices (HRD) on their Sam Browne equipment belts. Their Body Worn Video (BWV) cameras were affixed to their chests. Their side-handle batons were in the vehicle.

*stated, "we can book him on the possession of the gun for the open -- like, basically get the open charge, book him on an open charge so we can give the detectives time to, you know, they're going to try to do either continue the investigation further to lead up the workup for their 187 investigation but he wanted us to go -- go check it out."*⁹

Detective Yoshida notified his immediate supervisor, Lieutenant II Ryan Rabbett, Serial No. 33690, Operation Central Bureau (OCB) Homicide, and Lieutenant II Christopher Mayberry, Serial No. 32472, Hollenbeck Area Detectives, of the information he had received regarding Coleman and the subsequently developed plan to apprehend him.

At approximately 2000 hours, Lawrence called Detective Yoshida again and stated he believed Coleman had seen the police and fled the area. Detective Yoshida relayed that information to Sergeant Covarrubias and the two decided to end the operation. With that, the involved officers returned to Hollenbeck station and debriefed the incident. Officers Wilson, Castillo, Blanco and Almeda returned to their patrol assignments. The NED officers ended their work shift. Sergeant Covarrubias remained at the station to complete administrative duties.

At approximately 2100 hours, Officers Meraz, Bravo and Carbajal notified Sergeant Covarrubias that they were going to return to Pecan Park to look for Coleman. They further advised their supervisor that they would all be in an unmarked white Chevrolet Impala and that the remaining SPU officers, Mott and Malone, would be nearby in their black and white patrol vehicle.¹⁰ Officer Meraz was driving the Impala.

Note: The officers were assigned to a single unit because Bravo's regular partner was on a day off. According to the officers, the three had previously discussed operational tactics including contact and cover roles and the appropriate times to employ apprehension mode strategies versus those of containment mode. According to the officers, the tactics involved in a three-person unit were the same as a two-person unit. Officer Meraz (the driver) would be the contact officer, Officer Bravo (front passenger seat) would be the cover officer and Officer Carbajal (rear right passenger seat) would be an additional cover and/or communications officer. However, they acknowledged their roles could change depending on the dynamics of the situation.

The officers in the Impala were monitoring the area of Pecan Park while Officers Mott and Malone were in the area of 2nd Street and Pecan Street. At approximately 2138

⁹ Covarrubias, Page 13, Lines 20-25.

¹⁰ The Chevrolet Impala was assigned to the Hollenbeck Area Gang Detectives (License Plate No. 5CEU694, Shop No. 86437). The vehicle was equipped with a forward-facing red light, siren, police radio and blue and amber lights in the rear window. The vehicle was not equipped with a Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS) or ballistic door panels. The officers had received permission to use the plain vehicle from Captain III Richard Stabile, Serial No. 26260, Commanding Officer, Hollenbeck Area.

hours, Officer Meraz turned right and began driving south on Gless Street from 1st Street.¹¹

According to Officer Meraz, he observed a male Hispanic with a red baseball cap worn backwards, either a white or gray shirt and a fanny pack that was strapped over his right shoulder and hung underneath his left armpit. Meraz further described the individual as standing on the west sidewalk underneath a streetlight that illuminated his face. Officer Meraz immediately recognized Coleman and verbally alerted his partners in the car by stating, *“Hey, he’s the suspect”* while simultaneously pointing at Coleman.¹²

OIG Note No. 2: *According to Officer Meraz, “It appeared to me that the suspect was -- had his hand either in a fanny pack or a gun. I couldn’t -- I couldn’t tell. And he was looking at me.”*¹³

According to Officer Bravo, he also observed Coleman standing on the west sidewalk and immediately recognized him as the subject of the briefing from earlier in the night. Bravo described Coleman as wearing a red baseball cap worn backwards and a charcoal gray hooded sweatshirt. He also communicated to his partners by stating, *“Hey that’s the suspect.”*¹⁴

According to Officer Carbajal, he observed a male Hispanic south of an east/west alley on the west side of the sidewalk wearing a red hat and gray shirt that matched the description of Coleman. Carbajal overheard both Officers Meraz and Bravo simultaneously saying, *“Hey is that our guy? Is that our guy? As Meraz slowed down just to verify if that was the individual, I think I remember clearly saying -- all of us saying, ‘Hey, that’s going to be him.’”*¹⁵

Coleman turned north and faced the officers’ vehicle. Officer Meraz stated he observed Coleman looking directly at them and squaring himself toward them. Meraz observed Coleman reach into the fanny pack with his right hand and immediately began shooting at them. Officer Meraz stated, *“I heard a loud bang. I saw sparks and I saw what appeared to be a round being fired at me, and I saw what appeared to be a -- like pieces of cloth kind of breaking consistent with a firearm being fired from either the fanny pack or through a bag.”*¹⁶

¹¹ Gleaned from Officer Meraz’ BWV.

¹² Meraz, Page 18, Line 16.

¹³ *Id.*, Page 6, Lines 15-17.

¹⁴ Bravo, Page 10, Lines 11-12.

¹⁵ Carbajal, Page 17, Lines 21-25.

¹⁶ Meraz, Page 20, Lines 12-17.

Note: Based on the physical evidence collected from the scene (Discharged Cartridge Casings, bullets, etc.), it was determined that Coleman fired a minimum of seven rounds at the officers and used at least two different firearms.

OIG Note No. 3: *Physical evidence located at the scene of the OIS included three 7.62x39mm discharged cartridge casings as well as two projectiles consistent with bullets from 7.62x39mm ammunition and two projectiles consistent with bullets from .38 Special or .357 Magnum ammunition. A total of seven discrete bullet pathways were identified that were consistent with gunfire directed at the officers. None of the officers described seeing any additional suspects, and none of them observed what type of firearm(s) Coleman used when he shot at them during the incident.*

At approximately 2139 hours, Officer Meraz stopped the vehicle and placed it in park. He immediately exited from the driver's side door and unholstered his pistol with his right hand.

He took a two-handed grip, aimed and began to shoot at Coleman.

Meraz was positioned in between the door frame and the A-pillar of the vehicle and stated he lowered his body to use the engine block for cover. Officer Meraz fired a total of nine rounds at Coleman from an approximate distance of 50 feet in southwesterly direction.

Note: Prior to the OIS, Officer Meraz' BWV camera was powered on and in the appropriate stand-by mode with a two-minute buffer. Based on the camera's data log, Meraz' camera started audio recording at 2139:12 hours, which was after the OIS. Therefore, no audio of the gunfire was captured.

According to Officer Bravo, as Meraz stopped the vehicle, he opened his passenger side door, observed Coleman's arms extended, saw a muzzle flash and heard gunshots.

Officer Bravo stated, "*And at that time, it was just -- I knew I was behind the curve. Immediately knowing that I was being shot at and I thought, oh, crap this is the end, I drew my weapon.*"¹⁷ In immediate defense of his life, Officer Bravo unholstered his pistol, aimed and fired two rounds at Coleman in a southerly direction from an approximate distance of 47 feet. Bravo's passenger side window was in the raised

¹⁷ *Id.*, Page 10, Lines 21-24.

position and the first round that he fired struck and shattered the window causing glass fragments to fall to the ground.¹⁸

OIG Note No. 4: *According to Officer Bravo, “The window shattered. I honestly don’t know if it was me shooting, just trying to get rounds down as fast as I could or if it was his rounds that hit the door.”¹⁹*

Bravo then saw additional muzzle flashes from Coleman’s position so he took a kneeling position behind his open door for cover. Officer Bravo then observed Coleman was shuffling backwards as he fired additional rounds at the officers from behind a blue Chevrolet Suburban.

In response, Officer Bravo fired additional rounds at Coleman. The investigation determined Officer Bravo fired a total of four rounds at Coleman from an approximate distance of 47 feet (Investigators’ Note No. 1).

Note: Based on Officer Bravo’s BWV data log, his camera was completely powered down prior to the incident. The log shows that he powered on his camera at 2138:46 hours and activated his camera’s recording mechanism after the OIS at 2139:16. As such, there is only a 30 second video buffer on Officer Bravo’s footage instead of the two minutes of video buffer that would have been present had the camera been in standby mode prior to the incident (Investigators’ Note No. 2).

Officer Carbajal stated he exited the vehicle at the same time as Officer Bravo. He moved to his right and took a position of cover behind a red vehicle that was parked facing south on the west curb. He then moved to the west sidewalk and observed muzzle flashes from Coleman’s position as he (Coleman) fired at them.

OIG Note No. 5: *According to Officer Carbajal, “I take cover as I’m hearing shots being -- coming our way, and then I hear shatter of the -- of our window of the car.”²⁰*

Note: According to Officer Carbajal he could not see the firearm in Coleman’s hand(s) but did see Coleman’s arms extended toward them and the muzzle flashes coming from his position.

Officer Carbajal unholstered his weapon, assumed a two-handed grip, aimed and fired one round at Coleman in a southerly direction from an approximate distance of 49 feet. Carbajal stated that he attempted to fire another round at Coleman, but then observed

¹⁸ Gleaned from Officer Meraz’ BWV.

¹⁹ Bravo, Page 11, Lines 9-11.

²⁰ Carbajal, Page 18, Lines 11-13.

that his pistol had malfunctioned. *“Immediately after that I tried to press the trigger again and I had a spongy trigger. I guess my training kicked in. I immediately looked at my gun. I tap racked and I hit the top of the slide and I noticed I had a misfeed.”*²¹ After conducting a “tap and rack” and clearing the misfeed Officer Carbajal believed his gun was operational again, he looked up and saw Coleman running south and eventually out of his sight (Investigators’ Note No. 3).

Note: Based on Officer Carbajal’s BWV data log, his camera was completely powered down prior to the incident. The log shows that he powered on his camera at 2139:18 hours and activated his camera’s recording mechanism after the OIS at 2140:26 hours. As such, there is only a one minute, eight second video buffer on Officer Carbajal’s footage instead of the two minutes of video buffer that would have been present had the camera been in standby mode prior to the incident (Investigators’ Note No. 4).

Officer Meraz communicated to his partners that he was moving to the left, by yelling, *“Left, left, left!”*²² Meraz took a position of cover behind a parked vehicle that was facing north on the east side of Gless Street and told his partners that Coleman was by a Chevrolet Suburban south of them.


Officer Carbajal broadcast a help call and requested a perimeter be established. At 2139 hours, Officer Carbajal broadcast, *“Four Queen 22, Shots Fired, Officer Needs Help, Officer Needs Help. We have a suspect running southbound Gless, male Hispanic, wearing a red shirt, red hat. Queen 22 and Queen 24, Gless and 4th and 4th. Let me get a perimeter, suspect is running southbound on Gless. Suspect is going to be by a black Chevy, let me get a perimeter.”*

Note: Officer Carbajal was assigned to 4Q24. He misspoke when he identified himself as 4Q22.

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²¹ *Id.*, Page 18, Lines 22-25 and Page 19, Line 1.

²² Gleaned from Officer Meraz’ BWV.



The above diagram depicts the approximate locations from which the officers fired at Coleman.

At 2139:49 hours, Pilot Sergeant II+3 Anthony Demolina, Serial No. 26450, and Tactical Flight Officer Police Officer II+5 Michael O'Conner, Serial No. 34596, Unit Air 3, Air Support Division (ASD), responded to the Help Call and began to assist the officers in establishing a perimeter to contain Coleman.

At approximately 2140:07 hours, Officer Meraz notified his partners that he was going to reload his pistol.²³ He held his pistol with his right hand, reached into his magazine pouch with his left hand and retrieved a full magazine. He then conducted a tactical reload and placed the used magazine into his magazine pouch (Addendum No. 2). Sergeant Covarrubias responded to the Help Call with lights and siren from Hollenbeck station. At approximately 2140 hours, he arrived on scene and held a perimeter position at the intersection of 1st Street and Gless Street, north of the OIS location, until relieved by responding units.

At 2141 hours, Sergeant I Dana Grant, Serial No. 34715, Unit 4L20, arrived on scene and was directed by Covarrubias to respond to the involved officers' position and assist them. Sergeant Grant was the first supervisor to join the officers and immediately

²³ Gleaned from Officer Meraz' BWV.

began to assess the situation by asking them of the suspect's last known location. Grant also asked the officers if they were injured and learned that Officer Bravo had sustained a minor laceration to his knee. Sergeant Grant took control by directing officers to hold their positions and take cover in case the suspect returned or continued to fire at them. At approximately 2143 hours, Sergeant Covarrubias joined Grant and coordinated the establishment of a perimeter, a Command Post (CP) and requested additional supervisors.

At approximately 2150 hours, Sergeant De Alba, Detective II Ronald Chavarria, Serial No. 30816, Hollenbeck Night Watch Detective, and Sergeant I James Muniz, Serial No. 30963, Unit 31FB220, Transit Services Division (TSD), responded to the OIS location. Sergeant Covarrubias directed Detective Chavarria to remove Officer Bravo from the scene and to get him medical treatment if necessary. In addition, Detective Chavarria was instructed to obtain a Public Safety Statement (PSS) from Bravo and then to monitor him.

At 2156 hours, Detective Chavarria drove Officer Bravo to Mariachi Plaza, obtained a PSS and subsequently transported him to Hollenbeck station where he monitored him until relieved.

Note: Detective Chavarria advised Officer Bravo to record the PSS on his BWV because he did not have his notebook with him. During his interview with Force Investigation Division, Chavarria acknowledged that he erred when he ordered the PSS recorded.

At approximately 2202 hours, Sergeant Covarrubias met with Sergeant De Alba and provided him with a briefing of the incident. At approximately 2205 hours, De Alba declared himself the Incident Commander (IC) via Hollenbeck Base Frequency and directed officers to don their ballistic helmets. The CP was moved to 1st Street under the overpass of the 5 Freeway. Sergeant Covarrubias then collected the BWV cameras assigned to Officers Meraz and Carbajal.

At approximately 2210 hours, Sergeant Covarrubias obtained a PSS from Officer Meraz and continued to monitor him at the CP. Meraz remained at the CP in case Coleman was located and a field show-up became necessary.

At approximately 2245 hours, Sergeant Muniz obtained a PSS from Officer Carbajal. He then transported Carbajal to Hollenbeck station and monitored him.

At approximately 2250 hours, officers assigned to Metropolitan Division's K9 and Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) responded to the scene to assist in the search for Coleman. A systematic search of the area was performed and concluded at 0345 hours when it was determined that Coleman was no longer inside the perimeter.

At approximately 2250 hours, Police Officer III Arthur Rodriguez, Serial No. 26255, Department Operations Center (DOC), was notified of the Categorical Use of Force (Addendum No. 3).

On October 23, 2019 at 0030 hours, Detective II Dimitri Kort, Serial No. 34872, FID, was the first FID representative to arrive at scene.

Detective Kort reviewed all documents and circumstances surrounding the separation, monitoring and the admonition for the involved officers not to discuss the incident prior to being interviewed by FID investigators. Actions related to those protocols and the pertinent supervisor assessment was documented (Addenda Nos. 4 and 5).

Scene Description

The OIS occurred at approximately 2139 hours, mid-block on South Gless Street, south of 1st Street in the City of Los Angeles. The weather conditions were clear, and the incident occurred during the hours of darkness. Ambient lighting was provided by overhead streetlights. Gless Street had apartment complexes bordering the west side of the street and Pecan Recreation Center bordering the east. 1st Street was to the north with the Gold Line Metro Train tracks occupying the center of the street. 2nd Street was to the south. Suspect Coleman fired his weapons at the officers from in front of 121 South Gless Street in a northeasterly direction.



Graffiti at OIS location representing The Mob Crew

The area had graffiti markings attributed to TMC gang and was known to be a hangout for documented TMC gang members.

Canvass for Witnesses

Investigators assigned to FID canvassed the area of South Gless Street and Pecan Park on October 23 and 29, 2019, for witnesses to the OIS. Unless otherwise noted, the statements of all witnesses were recorded, transcribed and are contained in this

report. Ten citizens that resided on Gless Street were identified and interviewed by FID detectives. Copies of their Heard Only Statement Forms are in the FID casebook.

Suspect Information



Rodolfo Louis Coleman was a male Hispanic, with black hair and brown eyes. At the time of the incident, Coleman was five feet, nine inches tall, weighed approximately 150 pounds and had a date of birth of December 14, 1989. He was identified by California Identification and Index (CII) No. A26936924 and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) No. 613861KC2.

Coleman had a criminal history that included convictions for Possession and Transportation of Narcotics, Possession of a Firearm by a Felon and a Probation Violation for being a Felon in Possession of Ammunition. He is a documented member of the criminal street gang TMC with a moniker of “*Maniak*.” (Addendum No. 6).



Graffiti of Coleman’s gang moniker at the OIS location.

On October 24, 2019, Coleman was located, arrested and booked under section 664/187 of the California Penal Code (PC) - Attempt Murder on a Police Officer. Also arrested with Coleman was Raymundo DeLeon. DeLeon was arrested and booked for 32 PC - Accessory to Attempt Murder on a Police Officer and 23800(A)(1) PC- Ex-

Convict with a gun. At the time of arrest, Coleman and DeLeon were in a vehicle driving away from DeLeon's apartment complex. A black fanny pack and shoes were recovered in a duffle bag inside the vehicle. (Addendum No. 7)

A search warrant was served on DeLeon's apartment located at 1355 Court Street, Apartment No. 416, Los Angeles. During the service of the warrant, a loaded 9mm Smith and Wesson pistol was recovered. Additionally, a red baseball cap matching the one worn by the suspect during the OIS was also recovered inside the apartment.

Injuries

Officer Bravo sustained a minor laceration to his right knee when he kneeled on broken window glass. He advised his supervisors and sought his own medical treatment.

Coleman was not injured during the OIS.

Evidence

On October 23, 2019, at approximately 0645 hours, Supervising Criminalist Julie Wilkinson, Serial No. N4403, Criminalist III Steven Tsurumoto, Serial No. N4574, Criminalist II Anette Woiwode, Serial No. N4427, and Criminalist I Andrea Munoz, Serial No. N6276, FSD, Firearms Analysis Unit (FAU), responded to the scene and conducted an examination of the OIS scene for ballistic impacts, trajectories and projectiles. Their examination of the scene resulted in 56 items of evidence being recovered and booked.

Included in those items were three 7.62X39 Discharged Cartridge Casings (DCC) (Items 1 through 3), six bullet fragments of an unknown caliber (Items 4 through 9), nine 9mm DCC (Items 10 through 18), four .45-caliber DCC (Items 19 through 22), one .40-caliber DCC (Item 23), one round of live 9mm ammunition (Item 24), and one round of live .40-caliber ammunition (Item 25) (Addendum No. 8).

On October 24, 2019, at approximately 1530 hours, a search warrant was served at 1355 West Court Street. A Smith and Wesson, Model 5906, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol, Serial No. VCA3477, and a 15-round magazine with 14 live 9mm rounds were seized and booked (Items 26 through 28). A black Fanny pack (Item 31), White/Gray and Black Nike shoes (Item 33) and a red baseball hat (Item 34) were also recovered (Addendum No. 9).

A test fire of Officer Meraz' pistol was conducted by Criminalist Seror. Four 9mm DCC (Item 35), four 9mm bullets (Item 36), one live round of 9mm ammunition (Item 37) and eight live rounds of 9mm ammunition (Item 38) were booked (Addendum No. 10).

On October 23, 2019, at approximately 0300 hours, a cell phone was located and recovered at the crime scene (Item 39).

On October 24, 2019, an Apple iPhone was recovered from Suspect Coleman during his arrest (Item No. 40) (Addendum No. 11).

A test fire of Officer Carbajal's pistol was conducted by Criminalist Seror. Four .40-caliber DCC (Item 41), four .40-caliber bullets (Item 42), one live round of 40-caliber ammunition (Item 43) and 13 live rounds of .40-caliber ammunition (Item 44) were booked (Addendum No. 12).

A test fire of Officer Bravo's pistol was conducted by Criminalist Seror. Four .45 caliber DCC (Item 45), four .45 caliber bullets (Item 46), one live round of .45-caliber ammunition (Item 47), four live rounds of 45-caliber ammunition (Item 48) and eight live rounds of 45-caliber ammunition (Item 49) were booked (Addendum No. 13).

On October 28, 2019, a citizen located a fired bullet on Gless Street. Detective Kort took possession of the bullet and booked it at LAPD Property Division (Item 50) (Addendum No. 14).

On November 6, 2019, Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) swabs were obtained from a pistol and gun magazine (Items 26 and 27). The swabs were booked at LAPD Property Division for testing (Items 51 and 52) (Addendum No. 15).

A test fire of the pistol recovered from Deleon's apartment was conducted by Criminalist Woiwode. Eight 9mm DCC (Items 53 and 54), and eight 9mm bullets (Items 55 and 56) were booked (Addendum No. 16).

Note: Detective II Paul Inabu, Serial No. 30286, FID, Criminal Apprehension Team (CAT), inspected Coleman's Fanny pack and observed no bullet holes or defects in the fanny pack (Item 31).

Weapons

Officer Meraz was armed with a Department-issued black polymer 9mm, Smith and Wesson M&P, semiautomatic pistol, Serial No. HNU0165. According to Officer Meraz, at the time of the OIS, the pistol was loaded to capacity with 17 rounds of Winchester Ranger, 9mm, 147-grain T series RA9T, Department authorized ammunition in the magazine and one round in the firing chamber.

On October 23, 2019, Detective II Heather Gahry, Serial No. 31089, FID conducted a post-incident examination of Officer Meraz' pistol. She determined the firearm was loaded with one round of Department-authorized ammunition in the firing chamber and 17 rounds in the magazine. The detective then inspected the two additional magazines in Officer Meraz' magazine pouches and determined one magazine was loaded to capacity with 17 rounds of Department-authorized ammunition and the other was loaded with eight rounds. This information was consistent with Officer Meraz having fired a total of nine rounds during the OIS.

On November 5, 2019, Criminalist Seror completed a report documenting the test-firing of Officer Meraz' pistol. The pistol's trigger pull value was within the Department's established specifications (Addendum No. 17).

Detective Kort queried the Department's Firearm Inventory Tracking System (FITS) and verified that Officer Meraz' pistol had been entered into the system on March 29, 2017.

Officer Carbajal was armed with a Department-issued black polymer .40 caliber, Glock 22, semiautomatic pistol, Serial No. LCR685. According to Officer Carbajal, at the time of the OIS, the pistol was loaded with a total of 15 rounds of Smith and Wesson, Winchester Ranger, .40 Caliber, 180-grain, T-Series, RA40T, Department authorized ammunition, with 14 rounds in the magazine and one round in the firing chamber.

Note: Officer Carbajal advised FID detectives he had training a week prior and did not "top off" his magazine. He cleaned his gun and missed one round. Therefore, his magazine had one less round than capacity at the time of the OIS.

On October 23, 2019, Detective Gahry conducted a post-incident examination of Officer Carbajal's pistol. It was determined the firearm was loaded with one round of Department-authorized ammunition in the firing chamber and 13 rounds in the magazine. The detective inspected the two additional magazines Officer Carbajal carried in his magazine pouches and determined both magazines were loaded to capacity with 15 rounds of Department-authorized ammunition. This information was consistent with Officer Carbajal's statement and the physical evidence which indicated Officer Carbajal fired a total of one round during the OIS.

On November 4, 2019, Criminalist Seror completed a report documenting the test-firing of Officer Carbajal's pistol. The pistol's trigger pull value was within the Department's established specifications (Addendum No 18).

Detective Kort verified that Officer Carbajal's pistol had been entered into FITS on July 1, 2008.

Officer Bravo was armed with a Department-authorized .45-caliber, Smith and Wesson, 4506 semiautomatic pistol, Serial No. VMM7702. According to Officer Bravo, at the time of the OIS, the pistol was loaded to capacity with eight rounds of ACP Federal Premium, .45-caliber, 230 grain HST, P45HST2 (non +P) Department authorized ammunition in the magazine and one round in the firing chamber.

On October 23, 2019, Detective Gahry conducted a post-incident examination of Officer Bravo's pistol. She determined the firearm was loaded with one round of Department-authorized ammunition in the firing chamber and eight rounds in the magazine. The detective inspected the two additional magazines Bravo carried in his magazine pouches and determined one magazine was loaded with four rounds of Department-authorized ammunition and the other was loaded with eight rounds. This information

was consistent with Officer Bravo's statement and the physical evidence which indicated that he fired a total of four rounds during the OIS.

On November 7, 2019, Criminalist Seror completed a report documenting the test-firing of Officer Bravo's pistol. The pistol's trigger pull value was within the Department's established specifications (Addendum No. 19).

Detective Kort verified Officer Bravo's pistol had been entered into FITS on October 25, 2010.

Firearms Analysis

Criminalists from FSD identified a total of 17 bullet pathways in the 100 block of South Gless Street.

Due to the condition of the impact, directionality on Pathway (A) on a Chevy Impala, California (CA) License Plate No. 5CEU694, was unable to be determined.

Four pathways (B, L, M, P) one on a tree, two on a GMC Suburban, CA License Plate No. 8BEP377, and one on a road sign are consistent with traveling from south to north.

Three pathways (C, E, Q) one on a Toyota Corolla, CA License Plate No. 4URZ696, one on a trailer, CA License Plate No. 4LV2074, and one on the west exterior wall of the northwest building of the Pecan Recreation Center are consistent with south to north and west to east directionality.


Four pathways (F, G, H, O) three on a GMC Suburban, CA License Plate No. 8BEP377, and one on a Chevy Camaro, CA License Plate No. 7XWS501 are consistent with north to south directionality.

Five pathways (D, I, J, K, N) one on a Toyota Corolla, CA License Plate No. 4URZ696, and four on a GMC Suburban, CA License Plate No. 8BEP377 are consistent with north to south and east to west directionality (Addenda Nos. 20 and 21) .

Coleman was south of the officers and firing in a northerly direction. The officers were north of Coleman and firing their pistols in a southerly direction at the time of the OIS.

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DIAGRAM



The above diagram copied from FSD FAU Lab Report No. 5 depicts the approximate positions of Officers Bravo (B) and Meraz (M) and the general position of Coleman when he fired at the officers. The arrows represent the general bullet pathways.

Visual Documentation

Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS)

Detectives from FID reviewed the DICVS and viewed all relevant videos related to this incident.

Officers Meraz, Bravo and Carbajal were driving a plain unmarked vehicle that was not equipped with DICVS. Officers Malone and Mott's DICVS was activated but did not capture the OIS.

Body Worn Video

Force Investigation Division investigators identified the BWVs of seven officers as being related to this incident. The BWVs of the seven officers mentioned in this administrative summary were reviewed in detail. Officers Meraz, Bravo and Carbajal were wearing BWV cameras that recorded their respective OIS related activity. All the associated videos were post OIS which recorded officers' responding to the help call and perimeter activity

The BWVs of the officers mentioned in the administrative summary were additionally reviewed for compliance with the Office of Constitutional Policing and Policy Notice entitled, Powering Off Body-Worn Camera Devices While in Department Facilities, dated December 20, 2018, as well as compliance with Special Order No. 12, dated April 28, 2015, (Body Worn Video Procedures—Established). The following videos may be out of compliance for the reason indicated (Investigators' Note No. 5):

Officer	Less than 2-minute buffer	Delayed Activation
Sergeant Jose Covarrubias, Serial No. 35443	X	
Police Officer III Jose Carbajal, Serial No. 39480	X	X
Police Officer II Mark Bravo, Serial No. 36154	X	X
Sergeant Dana Grant, Serial No. 34715	X	

Outside Video

On October 23, 2019, video footage was recovered from Dolores Mission School located at 170 Gless Street. The videos are from three different cameras. All of the cameras were facing South Gless Street, but none captured the OIS or Coleman fleeing the area. The video was booked under Control No. 741091.

On October 23, 2019, video footage was recovered from the business Boca Factory located at 1605 East 1st Street. The camera was positioned north of the OIS on the north side of 1st Street. The recording captured the officers in their vehicle traveling east on 1st Street and then turning right traveling south on Gless Street. The vehicle stops approximately mid-block on Gless Street and the officers exit their vehicle. The

quality of the video images captured at a distance is poor and very pixilated. The video was booked under Control No. 741092.

Social Media

Police Officer II John Sewell, Serial No. 36614, FID, Investigative Support Section (ISU), downloaded three Instagram videos from an account user named “Shadyrican.” The videos are a few seconds in length and depict a driver of a vehicle driving past the crime scene. Officer Sewell also took a screenshot of the Instagram post by “Shadyrican” that depicted a group of men that called themselves “East Side TMC.”

A cell phone belonging to DeLeon was recovered when he was arrested with Coleman. The cell phone had the aforementioned video stored on his phone. It was determined that “Shadyrican” is DeLeon’s Instagram handle. DeLeon was filming the scene as he was driving east on 1st Street passing Gless Street. The videos recovered from Instagram did not capture the OIS. The videos are stored under Control No. 642098.

Photographs

Photographer III Robert Stichal, Serial No. N1962, Technical Investigation Division (TID), responded and photographed the OIS scene, the involved officers and associated evidence. The photographs are stored under Control Nos. D0770739, D0770740 and D0770558.

Notifications

At approximately 2250 hours, the DOC was notified of the OIS, details of subsequent notifications are attached (Addendum No. 3).

Personnel at Scene

Detective Kort arrived at scene on October 23, 2019 at approximately 0030 hours and was the first FID representative. Crime scene logs documenting additional personnel at the location are contained within the FID case file and are available for review.

Communications

A copy of the CD printout relative to Incident No. 19102200005094, is on file at FID. Digital recordings of Hollenbeck Area’s Base Frequency and City-wide Tactical Frequencies-1 and 2 capturing this incident are stored in the case book at FID and CD. (Addendum No. 22).

The related digitally recorded interviews are stored in the Training Evaluation and Management System (TEAMS II) database.

Justice System Integrity Division

This case did not meet the criteria for presentation to the Justice System Integrity Division (JSID).

Investigators' Notes

1. In reviewing Officer Bravo's BWV footage, it was observed that at some point during the incident his pistol had been placed on the ground. Further review of the video revealed that at 2139:05 hours, after the OIS, Officer Bravo retrieved his radio from his Sam Browne with his left hand. He then felt the need to adjust the volume on his radio. To do so, Officer Bravo placed his pistol on the ground with his right hand and then used his right hand to adjust the radio volume. The pistol was on the ground for approximately two seconds.
2. Detective Kort notified Lieutenant II James Antenucci, Serial No. 26784, FID, regarding Officer Bravo's video buffering issue. On March 9, 2020, Lieutenant Antenucci forwarded the information to Commander Timothy Nordquist, Serial No. 35492, Commanding Officer, Force Investigation Group. On March 10, 2020, Commander Nordquist then forwarded the information to the Office of Operations (OO) and the concerned Area Command for follow-up and disposition.
3. Officer Carbajal's pistol malfunctioned during the OIS due to a broken slide lock spring. Criminalist II Jacob Seror, Serial No. N4571, Forensic Science Division (FSD), recommended the pistol be sent to the LAPD Armory for examination. On October 30, 2019, the pistol was taken to the armory where Police Officer III Luke Paik, Serial No. 30188, Training Division, Firearms Section, inspected the pistol and repaired the slide lock spring. The pistol was subsequently returned to Officer Carbajal.
4. Detective Kort notified Lieutenant Antenucci regarding Officer Carbajal's video buffering issue. On March 9, 2020, Lieutenant Antenucci forwarded the information to Commander Nordquist. On March 10, 2020, Commander Nordquist then forwarded the information to OO and the concerned Area Command for follow-up and disposition.
5. Police Officer II Adam Mott, Serial No. 42551, Hollenbeck Patrol Division, responded to the Officer Needs Help call. While doing so, Mott's BWV depicts him steering his vehicle with his right hand while he was holding his unholstered pistol in the same hand. In addition, while positioned on the tactical perimeter, Officer Mott is depicted pointing his pistol and attached tactical light in the direction of an occupied vehicle and telling his partner, "Hey, watch that car."

Detective Kort notified Lieutenant Antenucci regarding the nature of this video footage. On March 9, 2020, Lieutenant Antenucci forwarded the information to

Commander Nordquist, who, on March 10, 2020, then forwarded the information to OO and the concerned Area Command for follow-up and disposition.

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CHIEF OF POLICE REPORT²⁴

Chief of Police Findings

Tactics – Tactical Debrief, Sergeants Covarrubias and Grant, along with Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal.

Drawing/Exhibiting – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal.

Lethal Use of Force – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers Meraz, Bravo and Carbajal.

Chief of Police Analysis

Detention

- Detective Yoshida notified Sergeant Covarrubias that a citizen by the name of Lawrence had provided information to Detective Yoshida about a recent homicide. Detective Yoshida explained that Lawrence overheard a male, Coleman, discussing his involvement in a homicide. Lawrence heard Coleman stated he was responsible for the homicide and had shot the victim. Detective Yoshida also advised Sergeant Covarrubias that a complete investigation into Coleman had not been completed. However, Lawrence had provided information that Coleman was currently standing on a residential street with a firearm in a fanny pack and was “banging” on people. Detective Yoshida explained to Sergeant Covarrubias that Coleman was a prohibited possessor due to his documentation as a gang member and previous criminal history. Therefore, Detective Yoshida told Sergeant Covarrubias, Coleman could be detained for being a prohibited possessor. Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal were notified of this information by Sergeant Covarrubias.

Lawrence had previously heard Coleman stating he was responsible for a recent homicide that occurred within Hollenbeck Area. Lawrence stated he observed Coleman holding a fanny pack and believed Coleman kept a firearm in the fanny pack. Lawrence also stated the Coleman was “banging on people” who were passing on the street. Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal drove towards the last know location of Coleman and observed a male standing under a streetlight. As Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal observed the male, who was illuminated by the streetlight above him, they recognized the male to be Coleman and matching the description provided by Lawrence. Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal stopped their police vehicle and opened their doors to exit. Coleman began firing at Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal with a firearm, which resulted in an OIS. Coleman subsequently fled to an unknown location and was apprehended two days later where he was taken into custody. Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal’s attempt to detain Coleman were appropriate and within Department policies and procedures.

²⁴ The information provided in this section summarizes the analysis and findings set forth in the Chief of Police’s report for this case.

Tactics

- Department policy relative to a Tactical Debrief is: *“The collective review of an incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those areas where actions and decisions could have been improved. The intent of a Tactical Debrief is to enhance future performance.”*

Department policy relative to Administrative Disapproval is: *“A finding, supported by a preponderance of the evidence that the tactics employed during a CUOF incident unjustifiably and substantially deviated from approved Department tactical training” (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05).*

The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be flexible and incident specific, which requires that each incident be looked at objectively and the tactics be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.

Tactical De-Escalation

- *Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.*

Tactical De-Escalation Techniques

- *Planning*
- *Assessment*
- *Time*
- *Redeployment and/or Containment*
- *Other Resources*
- *Lines of Communication (Use of Force - Tactics Directive No. 16, October 2016, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques)*

Tactical de-escalation does not require that an officer compromise his or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-escalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so.

Planning – Upon receiving information from Detective Yoshida, Sergeant Covarrubias began planning with SPU officers while at Hollenbeck CPS and assigned roles to each officer involved in the operation. Sergeant Covarrubias planned to only detain Coleman for an active crime of possessing a firearm as a prohibited possessor and not for his reported relation to the previous homicide. Sergeant Covarrubias planned to send SPU officers to the scene to monitor for

Coleman. Sergeant Covarrubias discussed escape routes commonly used by TMC gang members and planned accordingly by setting up the appropriate containment near the commonly used egress. Sergeant Covarrubias also discussed perimeters, foot pursuits, apprehension versus containment, and communication on simplex and base frequencies when operating a police vehicle with three officers inside. Sergeant Covarrubias stated officers in marked black and white vehicles would assist with containment and apprehension.

Officer Meraz, on the day of the incident, discussed a plan with Officers Bravo and Carbajal such as contact and cover, requesting backup if they observed Coleman, and the presence of an air ship before arriving at the location. Officer Bravo's plan was to be a contact officer as the front passenger, but stated Officers Meraz and Carbajal could also engage in that role, depending on the tactical situation. Officer Bravo discussed three officer tactics since he and his two partners would be deployed in the same vehicle. Officer Bravo ensured he had a less lethal option on his person due to the nature of the incident. Officer Bravo stated he was familiar with the tactics of his partner officers not just due to the conversations from the day of the incident but from previous training days together as well as working together in SPU for approximately three months. Officer Carbajal stated he and his two partners created a plan which involved Officer Carbajal being a cover officer. Officer Carbajal, the rear passenger, stated his role could change and could be taken over by Officer Bravo as well. Officer Carbajal gathered information on Coleman and conducted the briefing with involved officers. Officer Carbajal stated each officer was assigned a role.

After the OIS, Officer Carbajal continuously adjusted his plan and, after discovering Officer Bravo was injured, utilized an additional unit to transport Officer Bravo for medical treatment.

Sergeant Grant arrived at the scene of the OIS and began creating a plan to remove involved officers from the location to replace them with additional responding units, once available. Sergeant Grant also met with Sergeant Covarrubias and created a plan to assign responding supervisors to each involved officer for monitoring duties.

Assessment – Sergeant Covarrubias, upon receiving information about the suspect from Detective Yoshida, assessed the exigency of the information provided by Detective Yoshida. Sergeant Covarrubias determined it would be in the interest of public safety to respond immediately to prevent Coleman from possibly injuring community members.

Officer Meraz assessed Coleman upon seeing him and determined, based on tattoos and his description, Coleman was the suspect for which they were looking.

Officer Carbajal assessed after firing his first round at Coleman and observed his service pistol had malfunctioned. After clearing the malfunction, Officer Carbajal assessed and observed Coleman running away.

After the OIS occurred Sergeant Covarrubias arrived at the officer's location. Sergeant Covarrubias observed shattered glass from the police vehicle and rounds on the ground that he assessed to have been fired in a southbound direction. Sergeant Covarrubias began broadcasting his observations to Communications Division and requested containment as well as additional officers and supervisors.

Time – Sergeant Covarrubias determined that while the information Detective Yoshida provided was exigent and a public safety issue, a brief was important to create a plan and disseminate the information. The utilization of time allowed them to not only create their plan, but to also gather additional units for assistance. Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal all articulated their observations between and after they fired rounds at Coleman. Each officer utilized time to observe Coleman's actions and cease fire appropriately. Sergeant Grant ordered the officers to maintain cover as she utilized time to wait for additional resources before taking additional action in finding Coleman.

Redeployment and/or Containment – Officer Meraz, during the OIS, observed Coleman had stopped firing and was running in a direction away from the officers. Officer Meraz redeployed away from his vehicle towards a parked car to obtain a better position of cover, on the east sidewalk. Officer Bravo observed Coleman flee and lost sight of Coleman behind a large vehicle. Officer Bravo redeployed to a position from which he would have a better view of Coleman's last location, on the west sidewalk.

Officer Carbajal immediately requested containment be set up and provided CD with Coleman's description. Officer Carbajal also determined they were standing directly in front of a known location which commonly housed TMC gang members and directed his partners to redeploy in a northern direction to move away from the known gang house location.

Sergeant Covarrubias held a containment position upon his arrival to prevent Coleman from returning to his original location. However, as soon as additional units responded Sergeant Covarrubias redeployed to the involved officers' location.

Other Resources – Officer Carbajal, requested the assistance of Hollenbeck NED detectives. Officer Carbajal believed the detectives would be more effective at monitoring the park for Coleman since the detectives were in plain clothes and unmarked vehicles. Officer Carbajal also utilized the information gathered by Detective Yoshida and Officer Megliorino as he disseminated the information to his fellow officers and detectives during the briefing.

After the OIS, additional resources including an air unit, the K-9 unit, and SWAT team were utilized in an effort to safely locate Coleman and resolve the incident.

Lines of Communication – Officer Meraz communicated his actions during the OIS to his partners. Officer Meraz stated he was going to redeploy to another position of cover, east of his original location. Officer Meraz also advised his partners that he was conducting a tactical reload and requested they cover him while he did so. Officer Bravo observed Coleman run away and communicated his observations to his partners.

Officer Carbajal gathered additional information on Coleman from Officer Meglitorino by maintaining lines of communication with him. Officer Carbajal, throughout the OIS, continuously relayed his observations to CD and ensured responding officers knew the direction Coleman was traveling and that he was armed. Officer Carbajal also maintained communications with his partner officers after the OIS and determined Officer Bravo had sustained an injury. Officer Carbajal communicated the injury to CD to obtain medical treatment for Officer Bravo.

Sergeant Grant began communicating with the involved officers immediately upon arrival and gathered information regarding the ongoing tactical incident. Sergeant Grant also relayed that information to Sergeant Covarrubias when he responded.

Sergeant Covarrubias ensured lines of communication were preplanned while preparing for the operation and instructed Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal to have one officer broadcast on Hollenbeck Simplex and one on Hollenbeck Base Frequency, in the event they encountered Coleman. Upon Sergeant Covarrubias's arrival at the scene of the OIS, he immediately began communicating with the involved officers as well as the air unit, to set up containment and request additional resources. Sergeant Covarrubias also ensured responding personnel were given updated information.

The UOFRB noted the exigency of the circumstances originally provided by Detective Yoshida to Sergeant Covarrubias. Due to its nature, the information was similar to that of a high priority radio call. In this case, the UOFRB noted a patrol unit would have been deployed to look for the individual if the information was utilized to generate a radio call. The UOFRB noted in this instance, an operation plan was not required and were satisfied with Sergeant Covarrubias's decision to conduct a thorough briefing prior to deploying officers to look for and monitor Coleman. The UOFRB was also determined the notification to Sergeant De Alba concerning the information the officers had received with regard to the murder suspect and their course of action by Officers Carbajal and Bravo was adequate. The UOFRB noted Sergeant Covarrubias and Officers Carbajal and Bravo's actions met the department expectations given these delineated circumstances.

Additionally, the UOFRB noted solid communications by Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal amongst themselves during the OIS. The officers communicated their respective tactical procedures such as redeploying to alternative positions of cover and when conducting a tactical reload. The UOFRB noted the extensive communication between Sergeants Covarrubias and Grant at the scene of the OIS.

This assisted Sergeants Covarrubias and Grant to enact their plan quickly and without incident. Sergeant Covarrubias's communication before the OIS, and after, kept Sergeant De Alba apprised of the incident and prevented the need for additional briefings during this critical incident.

During the review of the incident, the following Debriefing Topics were noted:

Debriefing Point No. 1 Retention of Firearm During Tactical Scenario

Peace officers must always be aware of the location of their own firearm and be conscious of the opportunity it presents to those people around them.

Peace officers must be continually focused on:

- *what they are doing*
- *why they are doing it*
- *what is happening around them (Learning Domain 33, Chapter 6-4)*

After Officer Bravo discharged his service pistol at Coleman, Officer Bravo held his service pistol in his right hand and his police radio in his left hand. Officer Bravo placed his service pistol on the ground directly in front of himself and utilized his right hand to increase the volume control on his police radio. Officer Bravo then picked up his service pistol and held it in his right hand. Officer Bravo completed these actions while remaining behind cover.

Although the incident had rapidly escalated and Officer Bravo increased the volume of his police radio, a critical component to hearing transmissions, the UOFRB would have preferred that Officer Bravo had holstered his service pistol as he manipulated his police radio. The UOFRB noted the placement of his service pistol down onto the ground allowed for a greater risk of a possible negligent discharge. However, the UOFRB also noted that officers are allowed flexibility in their tactical response. If Officer Bravo had holstered his service pistol while he was in a kneeling position, it may have required him to move his service pistol and hand a greater distance than the location where he placed his service pistol down. In this incident, Officer Bravo placed his service pistol directly in front of him which allowed quicker access to his service pistol.

The Chief assessed Officer Bravo's actions of placing his service pistol onto the ground in front of himself. The Chief determined Officer Bravo's action was momentary while he still had immediate access to his service pistol at all times. After having been fired upon by Coleman, Officer Bravo believed the need to ensure a shots fired call was being broadcast was of greater importance than maintaining his grip on his service pistol. Since Officer Bravo was behind cover and his service pistol was in close proximity, the Chief determined his actions were appropriate.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and the Chief concurred, that Officer Bravo's actions were reasonable given the deadly actions of the suspect and did not deviate from approved Department tactical training. In order to enhance future performance, the Chief directed that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 2 Utilization of Cover

Cover is defined as any object or structure that will stop the opponent's bullets. Officers should attempt to move to and use available cover when involved in any tactical situation and especially when there are weapons involved. Officers should be aware of what items in their surrounding area can be used as cover and what type of cover is required to stop specific rounds (firearm, shotgun, or rifle rounds) (Los Angeles Police Department, Basic Firearms Manual, July 2015).

Whenever possible, officers should place an object between themselves and the suspect as cover or a barrier. A barrier could be a chain link fence, wrought iron gate or any similar object that prevents the assailant from reaching the officer. If the suspect is contained and does not pose an immediate threat to officers, the public or himself/herself, time is our best tool. Time allows more opportunity to communicate with the suspect and helps to calm the situation (Los Angeles Police Department, Training Bulletin, Volume XLVI, Issue 3, Weapons Other Than Firearms, October 2017).

After the OIS occurred, Officer Bravo left his position of cover and walked southbound on the west sidewalk of Gless Street without the benefit of cover. The UOFRB noted the aggressive nature of Coleman and that Coleman fired upon the officers without provocation. The UOFRB noted Officer Bravo not only had to protect his own life and the lives of his partners, but additionally had a duty to stop Coleman's aggressive deadly actions for the sake of public safety. Officer Bravo attempted to maintain observation of Coleman, and moved from cover to do so. In this case, it was understandable for Officer Bravo to obtain a better visual of Coleman to stop the threat and, to do so, had to momentarily leave a position of cover for those reasons.

The Chief assessed the trade off by Officer Bravo between having sufficient cover or stopping a deadly threat. For the protection of community members in the nearby park, and the fact that this incident took place on a residential street, the Chief determined the need for cover was lesser than the need for Officer Bravo to protect community members by attempting to maintain observation of Coleman's movements.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and the Chief concurred, that Officer Bravo's actions were reasonable given the deadly actions of the suspect and did not deviate from approved Department tactical training. In order

to enhance future performance, the Chief directed that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Additional Tactical Debrief Topics

- **Loading Standards** – The investigation revealed Officer Carbajal had loaded 14 rounds in the magazine of his service pistol. The fully loaded capacity for the magazine was 15 rounds. Officers are reminded to maintain their magazines in a fully loaded capacity. The Chief directed this to be a topic of discussion at the Tactical Debrief.
- **Tactical Planning** – Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal stated their tactical plan was to take Coleman into custody if they observed Coleman at the location. Sergeant Covarrubias stated the tactical plan for Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal was to monitor the area from a distance and, if Coleman was observed, they would call in nearby officers who were driving a marked black and white police vehicle in order to conduct the stop. Due to the threat Coleman presented to community members and his connection to a recent homicide, as revealed from Lawrence to Detective Yoshida and then to Sergeant Covarrubias, the need for a quick response was evident to Sergeant Covarrubias. Sergeant Covarrubias conducted a thorough briefing wherein officers were assigned roles and plan was created. However, a discussion for clarity of the actions for each role could have prevented the confusion between the officers and Sergeant Covarrubias as to their planned response if Coleman was observed. The Chief directed this to be a topic of discussion at the Tactical Debrief.
- **Service Pistol Malfunction** – Officer Carbajal's service pistol malfunctioned during the OIS. Officer Carbajal stated his service pistol, prior to the OIS, had previously malfunctioned several times during training. Officer Carbajal believed the malfunction could have been the result of dirt inside of his magazine, as well as his service pistol. It is necessary for officers to ensure their service pistols are well maintained and in good working order. Additionally, if an officer experiences a reoccurring malfunction they shall take their weapon to the Department Armory for inspection. Although Officer Carbajal's service pistol has now been inspected and received maintenance from a Department armorer, the Chief directed this to be a topic of discussion at the Tactical Debrief.²⁵
- **Basic Firearm Safety Rules** – Officer Bravo momentarily placed his right index finger onto the trigger of his service pistol as he used his right hand to turn up the volume on his police radio. Later in the incident, Officer Bravo again placed his right

²⁵ During the UOFRB, it was revealed a Department audit was conducted to determine the frequent malfunctioning of Department issued Glock brand firearms, specifically 40 caliber firearms. The audit concluded that a manufacturing error was the cause of the malfunction. All such firearms were inspected and repaired by the LAPD Armory.

index finger onto the trigger of his service pistol as he held his service pistol in a low-ready position. Officers are reminded of basic firearm safety rules and their importance not only for the safety of themselves and those around them, but also as a measure to prevent unintentional discharges. The Chief directed this to be a topic of discussion at the Tactical Debrief.

- **Situational Awareness** – Officer Carbajal broadcast a help call immediately after the OIS occurred. While doing so, Officer Carbajal incorrectly broadcast his unit designation as “4 Queen 22.” Officer Carbajal was actually assigned as unit 4 Queen 24. Officers are reminded of the importance of stating their correct unit designation to avoid confusion about their location for responding officers. The Chief directed this to be a topic of discussion at the Tactical Debrief.
- **Command and Control**

Command and Control is the use of active leadership to direct others while using available resources to coordinate a response, accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Command uses active leadership to establish order, provide stability and structure, set objectives and create conditions under which the function of control can be achieved with minimal risk. Control implements the plan of action while continuously assessing the situation, making necessary adjustments, managing resources, managing the scope of the incident (containment), and evaluating whether existing Department protocols apply to the incident.

Command and Control is a process where designated personnel use active leadership to command others while using available resources to accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Active leadership provides clear, concise, and unambiguous communication to develop and implement a plan, direct personnel and manage resources. The senior officer or any person on scene who has gained sufficient situational awareness shall initiate Command and Control and develop a plan of action. Command and Control will provide direction, help manage resources, and make it possible to achieve the desired outcome. Early considerations of PATROL will assist with the Command and Control process (Los Angeles Police Department, Training Bulletin, Volume XLVII Issue 4, July 2018).

Line Supervision – Defined. A supervisor who has the specific responsibility of issuing directions and orders to designated subordinates shall be considered as having the duty of line supervisor and shall be held accountable for achieving conformance with the directions and orders that he/she issues (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 135).

Incident Commander (IC) – In accordance with Department Policy, the IC sets the objectives, the strategy and directs the tactical response. Directing the tactical response means applying tactics appropriate to the strategy, assigning the right resources and monitoring performance (Los Angeles Police Department, Supervisor's Field Operations Guide, Volume 2, Emergency Operations Guide).

Detective Yoshida contacted Sergeant Covarrubias upon receiving information from "Lawrence". Detective Yoshida requested Sergeant Covarrubias' assistance in locating Coleman. Detective Yoshida advised Sergeant Covarrubias to treat the incident as a man with a firearm, similar to a radio call. Knowing Coleman was a documented gang member, Detective Yoshida advised Sergeant Covarrubias that Coleman could not be detained in relation to the homicide investigation, but instead, could be arrested for an open charge if the officers observed him in possession of the firearm which Lawrence had originally reported. When Detective Yoshida was advised by Lawrence that Coleman had fled the area of 1st Street and Gless Street at the sight of a police vehicle, he informed Sergeant Covarrubias to call off the operation.

The UOFRB noted Detective Yoshida provided clear instructions to Sergeant Covarrubias by discussing the ongoing homicide investigation and its separation from Coleman's prohibited possession and public safety issue. Detective Yoshida provided thorough parameters for the basis of the detention of Coleman for Sergeant Covarrubias and SPU officers. Without delay, Detective Yoshida advised Sergeant Covarrubias to discontinue the response, as he became aware of new information and in the interest of public safety.

The actions of Detective Yoshida were consistent with Department supervisory training and met the Chief's expectations of a supervisor during an on-going investigation and related operations.

Sergeant Covarrubias received the information with regard to Coleman from Detective Yoshida. Sergeant Covarrubias directed officers to meet at the station for a briefing. During the brief, Sergeant Covarrubias ensured SPU officers had the assistance of not only a set back up unit driving a marked black and white police vehicle, but also two additional units to assist with containment. Sergeant Covarrubias maintained contact with Detective Yoshida and continually updated personnel on the operation.

When Detective Yoshida requested the operation be ended, Sergeant Covarrubias immediately pulled officers off the operation and returned to Hollenbeck CPS to debrief the incident. Officers Carbajal, Meraz, Bravo, Mott, and Malone advised Sergeant Covarrubias they were going to continue their crime suppression patrol in the area of 1st Street and Gless Street. Sergeant Covarrubias remained at Hollenbeck CPS to complete administrative duties. When Sergeant Covarrubias heard that Officers Meraz, Bravo and Carbajal request help over the police radio, Sergeant Covarrubias initiated his response. Upon his initial arrival, Sergeant Covarrubias did not respond to the officer's location, instead he held a perimeter position at the corner of 1st Street and Gless Street. After he observed Sergeant Grant responding he directed her to respond to the involved officer's location. Approximately three minutes later, Sergeant Covarrubias flagged down responding officers to replace him, allowing him to respond to the location of Officers Meraz,

Bravo and Carbajal. Sergeant Covarrubias did so and began gathering suspect information. Sergeant Covarrubias identified Officer Meraz as an officer involved in the OIS, separated him and drove him to the CP location where he and obtained his PSS.

The UOFRB evaluated Sergeant Covarrubias's actions during this incident and noted that he demonstrated active leadership and displayed a calm and patient demeanor. While it is often expected that Department supervisors respond to assert control of a tactical incident instead of other duties, such as holding a portion of the perimeter, Sergeant Covarrubias' rationale and reasoning, and the need to balance the immediate tactical situation to contain the location was understandable with the need to respond to the scene of the OIS. Sergeant Covarrubias directed Sergeant Grant to continue her response to the scene to ensure that supervisory oversight was being initiated. Sergeant Covarrubias held his perimeter position for approximately two minutes. At the first opportunity, Sergeant Covarrubias replaced himself with a patrol unit and responded to the scene of the OIS with a minimal delay. Once at the location, Sergeant Covarrubias utilized planning, time, additional resources, and communication to effectively manage an ongoing and dynamic tactical incident as officers attempted to contain a shooting suspect.

The actions of Sergeant Covarrubias were consistent with Department supervisory training and met the Chiefs expectations of a supervisor during a critical incident.

Sergeant Grant arrived at the location of the involved officers. Sergeant Grant directed officers to take cover and began assessing Officer Bravo's injuries. Sergeant Grant advised officers to maintain cover until she could access a ballistic shield. Sergeant Grant began developing a plan with the officers and explained their priority was to order community members back into their homes. The UOFRB noted Sergeant Grant's continuous communication with the officers at scene as she was planning. Sergeant Grant also communicated with Sergeant Covarrubias and took an active role in the planning and management of the incident, while working in conjunction with additional responding supervision.

The actions of Sergeant Grant were consistent with Department supervisory training and met the Chief's expectations of a supervisory during a critical incident.

Detective Chavarria arrived at the incident and identified Officer Blanco as an officer involved in the OIS. Detective Chavarria separated Officer Blanco, transported him to the CP location, and obtained a PSS.²⁶

²⁶ The OIG noted that this section of the Chief's report appears to inadvertently identify Officer Blanco in place of Officer Bravo.

The actions of Detective Chavarria were consistent with Department supervisory training and met the Chief's expectations of a field supervisor during a critical incident.

Sergeant De Alba, assigned as Assistant Watch Commander, responded to the location from Hollenbeck CPS and assumed the role of IC wherein he broadcast his IC status over Hollenbeck Base Frequency. Sergeant De Alba directed all officers at scene, via CD, to don their ballistic helmets as he established the CP. Sergeant De Alba advised Sergeant Covarrubias to respond to the CP and assist with organizing the tactical operation. Sergeant De Alba also briefed responding K-9 and SWAT officers of the circumstances concerning the tactical incident. Sergeant De Alba remained at the CP until K-9 and SWAT personnel had completed their searches for Coleman. The UOFRB noted Sergeant De Alba maintained continuous lines of communication with SPU officers and Sergeant Covarrubias throughout the incident. Sergeant De Alba was able to quickly assume the role of IC due his active communication before and during the incident. Sergeant De Alba, along with the rapid response of additional resources and personnel were able to resolve this incident.

The actions of Sergeant De Alba were consistent with Department supervisory training and met the Chief's expectations of field supervisors during a critical incident.

Sergeant Muniz arrived and identified Officer Carbajal as an officer involved in the OIS. Sergeant Muniz separated Officer Carbajal and drove him to the CP location where he obtained Officers Carbajal's PSS.

The actions of Sergeant Muniz were consistent with Department supervisory training and met the Chief's expectations of a field supervisor during a critical incident.

Tactical Debrief

- In conducting an objective assessment of this case, the UOFRB determined, and the Chief concurred, that Sergeants Covarrubias and Grant, as well as Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal's tactics did not deviate from approved Department tactical training.

Each tactical incident also merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this case, there were areas identified where improvement could be made. A Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for the involved personnel to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident.

Therefore, the Chief directed that Sergeants Covarrubias and Grant, as well as Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal, attend a Tactical Debrief and that the specific identified topics be discussed.

Note: Additionally, the Tactical Debrief shall also include the following mandatory discussion points:

- Use of Force Policy;
- Equipment Required/Maintained;
- Tactical Planning;
- Radio and Tactical Communication (including Code Six);
- Tactical De-Escalation;
- Command and Control;
- Lethal Force.

General Training Update (GTU)

- On November 07, 2019, Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal attended a GTU. The GTU covered all mandatory topics.

Drawing/Exhibiting

- Department policy relative to drawing and exhibiting a firearm is: *“An officer’s decision to draw or exhibit a firearm should be based on the tactical situation and the officer’s reasonable belief there is a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified” (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume No. 1, Section 556.80).*

Officer Meraz

According to Officer Meraz, he observed Coleman’s hand was in his fanny pack. Officer Meraz placed his vehicle in park and opened his driver door with his left hand. As Officer Meraz began exiting the driver seat to conduct a stop on Coleman, he observed a muzzle flash and a loud bang from Coleman’s direction. Officer Meraz immediately recognized Coleman was shooting at him. Officer Meraz leaned out of his vehicle as he drew his service pistol. Officer Meraz utilized a two-handed grip to take hold of his service pistol.

Officer Meraz recalled, *I saw the suspect and he was standing on the sidewalk and he looked in my direction. I immediately recognized him and told my partners that that was the suspect we were looking for. It appeared to me that the suspect was -- had his hand either in a fanny pack or a gun. I couldn’t -- I couldn’t tell. And he was looking at me. So I immediately put the car into park and attempted to get out to, you know, conduct the stop on him when I observed a muzzle flash and a loud bang from the suspect in my direction. So as I observed that, I immediately recognized that he was shooting.*²⁷

²⁷ Meraz, Page 6, Lines 10-22.

So I threw the -- I put the vehicle in park. I opened up the door with my left hand, and I leaned out of the vehicle as I drew my firearm and began -- With my right hand I took a two-handed grip.²⁸ As -- as -- simultaneously as I was putting in park when I observed the muzzle flash and the boom, I immediately recognized that he was shooting at me and my partners.²⁹ He would be on the west side -- west sidewalk.³⁰

Officer Bravo

According to Officer Bravo, he opened his front passenger door and stepped out of the vehicle after he observed Coleman. While stepping out, Officer Bravo observed the muzzle flash and heard gunshots. Officer Bravo made eye contact with Coleman and observed Coleman's arms extending. Officer Bravo knew he was being shot at by Coleman. Officer Bravo drew his service pistol to defend his life and the lives of his partners.

Officer Bravo recalled, As soon as I open the door and my foot stepped, I just saw the muzzle flash and heard the gunshots. I remember looking at him, just making eye contact and arms extending and seeing the muzzle flash. And at that time, it was just -- I knew I was behind the curve. Immediately knowing that I was being shot at and I thought, oh, crap this is the end, I drew my weapon. I unholstered and drew my weapon to immediately defend my life and my partners knowing that we were being shot at.³¹

Officer Carbajal

According to Officer Carbajal, he began to exit the rear passenger seat of his vehicle after observing Coleman. Officer Carbajal heard shots being fired in his and his partner officers' direction. Officer Carbajal immediately began to "jump out" of his vehicle. Officer Carbajal heard a window shattering from his vehicle. Officer Carbajal redeployed slowly to the right of a car parked next to the west sidewalk of Gless Street. Officer Carbajal observed Coleman shooting in his direction. Officer Carbajal drew his service pistol utilizing a two-handed grip.

Officer Carbajal recalled, I immediately recognize as that's the suspect. As I'm trying to get out of the car -- and I think Officer Bravo and myself, we both opened the right passenger doors. He opens the front; I open the rear. I start hearing shots fired coming in our direction. I take cover. I immediately jump out of the car and I -- there's a -- I think it was a red car directly -- not directly -- next to us on the west side. I jump out. I take cover as I'm hearing shots being -- coming our way, and

²⁸ *Id.*, Page 21, Lines 7-10 and 12-13.

²⁹ *Id.*, Page 6, Line 25 and Page 7, Lines 1-2.

³⁰ *Id.*, Page 25, Lines 14-15.

³¹ Bravo, Page 10, Lines 17-25 and Page 11, Line 1.

then I hear shatter of the -- of our window of the car. I'm hearing shots being -- coming our way, and then I hear shatter of the -- of our window of the car... I move slowly to the right of that car off to the sidewalk -- to the west sidewalk. I draw my weapon, and I see the suspect still shooting at us. At that point I drew my weapon, two-hand grip. I had sight of the suspect shooting at us, and I had eyes on him.³²

The plan was if we saw this individual, we were going to detain, put out a backup. As all that was about to happen, we started taking shots. In fear for my life and my partners, we immediately jumped out of the cars, took cover.³³ As I'm trying to get out of the car -- and I think Officer Bravo and myself, we both opened the right passenger doors. He opens the front; I open the rear.³⁴

And I didn't say this earlier, but I did identify myself as I got out of the car. I did say, "Stop. Police." I know I made contact with him. I utilize my flashlight. So, you know, I think he -- this guy was just ready to shoot it out with anybody.³⁵ I made contact and I saw and I recognized him, and within seconds he drew a firearm and started shooting at us.³⁶

In this case, the UOFRB noted Coleman was the initiator of aggressive and deadly actions as he fired upon Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal as they exited their vehicle. The UOFRB noted Coleman created a substantial risk of death which lead to Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal defending their lives by drawing their service pistols.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and the Chief concurred, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal while faced with similar circumstances, would reasonably believe that there was a substantial risk the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified.

Therefore, the Chief found Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal's Drawing/Exhibiting to be In Policy, No Further Action.

Use of Force – General

- *It is the policy of this Department that personnel may use only that force which is "objectively reasonable" to:*

³² Carbajal, Page 18, Lines 2--18.

³³ *Id.*, Page 28, Lines 10-14.

³⁴ *Id.*, Page 18, Lines 3-7.

³⁵ *Id.*, Page 41, Lines 8-12.

³⁶ *Id.*, Page 23, Lines 24-25 and Page 24, Line 1.

- *Defend themselves;*
- *Defend others;*
- *Effect an arrest or detention;*
- *Prevent escape; or,*
- *Overcome resistance*

The Department examines reasonableness using Graham v. Connor and from the articulated facts from the perspective of a Los Angeles Police Officer with similar training and experience placed in generally the same set of circumstances. In determining the appropriate level of force, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of facts and circumstances of each particular case. Those factors may include, but are not limited to:

- *The seriousness of the crime or suspected offense;*
- *The level of threat or resistance presented by the subject;*
- *Whether the subject was posing an immediate threat to officers or a danger to the community;*
- *The potential for injury to citizens, officers or subjects;*
- *The risk or apparent attempt by the subject to escape;*
- *The conduct of the subject being confronted (as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time);*
- *The amount of time and any changing circumstances during which the officer had to determine the type and amount of force that appeared to be reasonable;*
- *The availability of other resources;*
- *The training and experience of the officer;*
- *The proximity or access of weapons to the subject;*
- *Officer versus subject factors such as age, size, relative strength, skill level, injury/exhaustion and number officers versus subjects; and,*
- *The environmental factors and/or other exigent circumstances (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10).*

Lethal Use of Force

Law enforcement officers are authorized to use deadly force to:

- *Protect themselves or others from what is reasonably believed to be an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent a crime where the subject's actions place person(s) in imminent jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent the escape of a violent fleeing felon when there is probable cause to believe the escape will pose a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others if apprehension is delayed. In this circumstance, officers shall, to the extent practical, avoid using deadly force that might*

subject innocent bystanders or hostages to possible death or injury (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume No.1, Section 556.10).

Officer Meraz – 9mm, nine rounds in a southwesterly direction from an approximate distance of 32 feet.

According to Officer Meraz, he observed sparks from Coleman's direction and pieces of cloth breaking, consistent with a firearm being fired from a fanny pack or through a bag. Officer Meraz believed it was possibly a higher caliber weapon. Officer Meraz determined Coleman was a deadly threat to Officer Meraz and his partner officers. Officer Meraz exited the vehicle and crouched low for cover while positioned between the frame of the window of the driver door and the A-pillar of the vehicle. Officer Meraz utilized a two-handed grip and fired in a southwest direction at Coleman. Each time Officer Meraz would fire, he would quickly reassess to see if Coleman was still standing and firing his firearm. Officer Meraz observed during each assessment, that it appeared Coleman was still firing rounds at Officer Meraz. Officer Meraz recalled he fired nine rounds from his service pistol in a consecutive manner, with a pause in between each round he fired. Officer Meraz fired in a rapid manner since he believed Coleman had more fire power and needed to be stopped. Officer Meraz believed Coleman fired approximately three to four rounds in his direction.

Officer Meraz recalled, *I heard a loud bang. I saw sparks and I saw what appeared to be a round being fired at me, and I saw what appeared to be a -- like pieces of cloth kind of breaking consistent with a firearm being fired from either a fanny pack or through a bag.*³⁷ *To me it sounded like a shotgun. I don't -- the boom sounded very loud, maybe louder than a normal pistol. So it sounded to me like a higher caliber weapon.*³⁸ *...it looked like sparks coming at me and kind of blossoming into a circle. And it appeared that there was a spark that landed a little bit further -- almost just directly in front of my car.*

*I don't know if that was a round from the suspect hitting the asphalt or what. But I remember seeing that -- that muzzle flash -- that fiery explosion and that spark on the ground.*³⁹ *It looked to me like it was about, I'd say, five feet in front of the vehicle.*⁴⁰ *So I in turn got out of the vehicle and returned fire in his direction. At which point he continued to fire and we exchanged gunfire.*⁴¹

³⁷ Meraz, Page 20, Lines 12-17.

³⁸ *Id.*, Page 27, Line 25 and Page 28, Lines 1-3.

³⁹ *Id.*, Page 28, Lines 10-17.

⁴⁰ *Id.*, Page 41, Lines 12-13.

⁴¹ *Id.*, Page 7, Lines 3-5.

I immediately got out of the vehicle and began to engage him and return fire to -- in attempt to stop him from shooting me or my partners... With my right hand I took a two-handed grip and began to shoot at the suspect and while staying low to maintain cover between -- with the engine block and the suspect, so he couldn't fire rounds and hit me. ...When I came on sight and had my -- when I was aiming at the suspect, I put my finger on the trigger ready to shoot him... I was shooting in between the -- I don't know how to describe it. The windshield frame... That's -- I was -- I was shooting between the frame of the window of the door and the A-pillar of the vehicle and while maintaining a low, almost crouched posture to keep myself from standing up and becoming a better target... To stop the threat from -- you know, from the suspect from shooting me.⁴² I was firing southwest towards the suspect.⁴³

My first initial return fire was rapid, because I needed to -- he already had fire superiority over us and I needed to, you know, gain fire superiority over the suspect.⁴⁴ And then it appears as though he shot another shot at me, so I kind of ducked and then returned fire again. There's kind of a break in the shots. And it was all just to basically stop the threat and keep the suspect from firing at me and my partners.⁴⁵

Every time I would shoot, I'd quickly reassess to see if he was still standing there and firing rounds or if he had the gun in his hand. And every time I did my reassessment, it appeared to me that he was still firing rounds at me and holding the gun and still remained a very real threat to me and my partners. ...After my final round, it appeared to me that the suspect had fled southbound and that's when I decided to use that opportunity to redeploy.⁴⁶

After my final round, I reassessed again, I redeployed, and then I did a reload. I reloaded my weapon, and I reassessed to -- and I started communicating with my partners, telling them, "Hey, suspect was running southbound," and I gave them an approximate location of where I saw them and so they could broadcast that to responding units.⁴⁷

⁴² *Id.*, Page 20, Lines 23-25; Page 21, Line 1, Lines 12-16, and Lines 21-23; Page 22, Lines 4-6 and Lines 14-18; and Page 23, Lines 17-18.

⁴³ *Id.*, Page 28, Lines 21-22.

⁴⁴ *Id.*, Page 36, Lines 7-10.

⁴⁵ *Id.*, Page 36, Lines 11-15.

⁴⁶ *Id.*, Page 24, Lines 17-23; Page 25, Lines 7-10.

⁴⁷ *Id.*, Page 25, Lines 24-25 and Page 26, Lines 1-6.

*It was consecutive fire with a pause between -- I'm not sure which rounds when the suspect fired back at me. That was the only pause from my shooting to him and him exchanging fire with me.*⁴⁸

When asked by the FID investigator how many rounds he fired at Coleman, Officer Meraz recalled, *I believe nine -- nine rounds.*⁴⁹

When the FID investigator asked Officer Meraz, "Did you fire in rapid succession?" Officer Meraz recalled, *Because the threat was --he was continuing to shoot at me.*⁵⁰

When asked by the FID investigator how long it took to fire all nine rounds, Officer Meraz recalled, *Approximately ten seconds.*⁵¹

When asked by the FID investigator how many rounds Coleman fired, Officer Meraz recalled, *I can only give an approximate. I approximate three to four.*⁵²

The UOFRB noted Officer Meraz initially utilized rapid fire. The UOFRB considered that Officer Meraz' assessed between each round. Additionally, Officer Meraz communicated his redeployment to other officers after firing his last round. The UOFRB noted his communication spoke to Officer Meraz' training in maintaining situational awareness and tactical communication. The UOFRB also noted Coleman was actively firing upon Officer Meraz, from a close distance, in a residential neighborhood with a public park and patrons nearby. The incident necessitated Officer Meraz to defend not only his own life, but to also stop Coleman from hurting other community members. Additionally, the UOFRB noted Coleman fired multiple times at Officer Meraz, demonstrating a notable degree of Coleman's aggression. The UOFRB also noted that Officer Meraz, in response to the imminent deadly threat, discharged nine rounds from his service pistol. Officer Meraz assessed again after his last round and ceased fire as he observed Coleman shuffling backwards, away from the Officer Meraz and out of Officer Meraz' view.

Based on a preponderance of evidence and totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and the Chief concurred, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer Meraz would reasonably believe Coleman's actions presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and that the use of lethal force would be objectively reasonable.

⁴⁸ *Id.*, Page 36, Lines 19-23.

⁴⁹ *Id.*, Page 23, Lines 3-4.

⁵⁰ *Id.*, Page 24, Lines 5-6.

⁵¹ *Id.*, Page 36, Lines 19-23.

⁵² *Id.*, Page 40, Lines 20-21.

Officer Bravo – .45 caliber, four rounds, in two volleys of fire from an approximate distance of 30 feet.

According to Officer Bravo, he did not observe Coleman with a firearm. However, as soon as he stepped out of his police vehicle, Officer Bravo observed Coleman's hands extended and observed a muzzle flash. Officer Bravo observed each muzzle flash had the same circular pattern.

Officer Bravo recalled, *I couldn't see the weapon. When as soon as I stepped out of the car, I just saw his hands extend and saw the muzzle flash and that kind of illuminated everything where I didn't really see what was behind; I couldn't make out the firearm... The muzzle flash kind of had the same pattern, you know, same kind of circumference. Everything seemed to be consistent from round to round... So, like I said, initially, saw the muzzle flash of his firearm and I heard the gunshots. As soon as I saw that, I drew my firearm and was already extending out my arms and the glass was breaking. Like I said, it seemed simultaneous.*⁵³

*Sure. When I saw the suspect, he was standing behind the Toyota Corolla, I saw just a bright orange flash that almost looks like a flame, kind of -- I saw the flame, heard the gunshot and then the flame kind of extended into a circular pattern... It was right over the roof of the car.*⁵⁴

When the FID investigator asked, "How many times did you see that", Officer Bravo recalled, *All together, approximately four to five times.*⁵⁵ *Like I said, I fired when I saw the muzzle flash and heard the gunshot, I immediately returned fire and then again saw an additional muzzle flash as he is backing up and I fired an additional round at the suspect.*⁵⁶

Volley One – Two rounds, in a southerly direction from an approximate distance of 35 feet.

According to Officer Bravo, in response to seeing Coleman's muzzle flash and observing Coleman shooting at him and his partners, Officer Bravo, acquired his front sight, and fired his first round and second round at Coleman, as a controlled pair.⁵⁷ As Officer Bravo fired at Coleman from behind the front passenger door, the

⁵³ *Id.*, Page 17, Lines 24-25; Page 18, Lines 1-3; Page 18, Lines 12-15, and Page 19, Lines 3-6.

⁵⁴ *Id.*, Page 27, Lines 17-24.

⁵⁵ *Id.*, Page 28, Lines 1-2.

⁵⁶ *Id.*, Page 29, Lines 24-25 and Page 30, Lines 1-2.

⁵⁷ A controlled pair consists of firing two rounds with the sight picture being verified (flash sight picture) before each shot. At moderate distances, the controlled pair may be appropriate in order to ensure that both rounds hit the target (LAPD Firearms Manual, "Firing in Pairs", Page 29).

window shattered. Officer Bravo was unsure if the shattering was caused by his fired rounds or if it was due to Coleman firing at him.

*Officer Bravo recalled, I kind of extended front side and fired my first round at the suspect. Immediately after, I fired an additional round and there was another muzzle flash coming from the suspect. So, after I saw his muzzle flash and heard the gunshot, I fired my first round and immediately fired another round as a controlled pair directly at the suspect.*⁵⁸

*I fired, I think two rounds right away as soon as I saw the muzzle flash and saw him shooting at us. I just acquired my front side and just put two rounds and just tried to put a controlled pair right at the suspect. The window shattered. I honestly don't know if it was me shooting, just trying to get rounds down as fast as I could or if it was his round that hit the door; I honestly don't know. I just remember the glass shattering.*⁵⁹

Volley Two – Two rounds, in a southwesterly direction from an approximate distance of 35 feet.

According to Officer Bravo, after firing the first two rounds from his service pistol and hearing the glass shatter in front of him, Officer Bravo believed Coleman's rounds were striking the vehicle that Officers Bravo, Meraz, and Carbajal had deployed from. Officer Bravo took a kneeling position to get low behind his passenger door and pried out to see Coleman. Officer Bravo observed Coleman backing up in a shuffling manner, towards a Suburban vehicle parked along the curb. Officer Bravo observed two muzzle flashes and heard the sound of a fired round. From his kneeling position, Officer Bravo fired an additional round at Coleman. Officer Bravo stated Coleman was still standing at the Suburban when he fired the round at Coleman. Officer Bravo observed Coleman continue to back up. Officer Bravo fired an additional round after the last muzzle flash and gunshot that he had heard. Officer Bravo stated the rounds were in a southwesterly direction towards Coleman.

Officer Bravo recalled, I saw additional muzzle flashes. I could hear the gunshots going off. I knew we were being shot at, so I went down to a kneeling position behind the door. At that time, there was, I think, it was a Toyota Corolla, he was standing behind the Toyota Corolla, so I can mainly see just from about the shoulders and his head. So, as I was returning fire, I could see that he was backing up, kind of shuffling backwards going southbound on the sidewalk. He was still kind of hugging the cars. And then he backed up towards, it was blue Suburban, and I could still see muzzle flash, saw that he fired another two rounds; this was probably about the fourth round that I saw the muzzle flash and heard the shot. So from the

⁵⁸ Bravo, Page 19, Lines 18-25 and Page 20, Line 1.

⁵⁹ *Id.*, Page 11, Lines 4- 13.

kneeling position, I fired additional rounds, I think, three rounds from the kneeling position at the suspect when he was alongside of the Suburban.⁶⁰

After I fired those rounds and the glass shattered, in my mind I thought it was his round that struck the door. I thought it was his round that broke that glass. That's the first thing that went through my head was like, oh, crap, his rounds are hitting us. So, I got down to a kneeling position and tried to get as low as I could behind the door and I kind of pried out next to the door to see the suspect and I could see him backing up, like, shuffling backwards towards the Suburban. And then I saw another two muzzle flashes and heard the gunshots; that's when I fired one more round at the suspect. He continued to back up and I fired another round after the last muzzle flash and gunshot that I heard... the rounds were going to be fired in like a southwest direction towards the suspect on the sidewalk.⁶¹... he was alongside the Suburban. At that time, I was yelling for Officer Carbajal, put it out, you know, put it out. I couldn't see the suspect anymore; I lost him behind the Suburban.⁶²

The UOFRB noted that Coleman fired upon the officers first, without provocation. During Officer Bravo's first volley, Officer Bravo observed Coleman's arms extended in a manner consistent with holding a firearm. Officer Bravo then observed muzzle flash which indicated that Coleman was firing at Officer Bravo and the other officers. Officer Bravo assessed and returned fire to stop the threat Coleman continued to present.

The UOFRB noted that Officer Bravo heard glass shattering and believed the vehicle was being struck by Coleman's gunfire. Officer Bravo observed additional muzzle flash from Coleman and returned fire for Volley Two. Officer Bravo assessed again after his last round and ceased fire as he observed Coleman shuffling backwards, away from the Officer Bravo and out of his view.

The UOFRB also noted that Officer Bravo, in response to the imminent deadly threat, discharged two volleys of two rounds each, controlled pairs, for a total of four rounds from his service pistol. Both volleys were conducted utilizing the controlled pair technique of fire control. The UOFRB conducted a thorough review of Officer Bravo's use of controlled pairs and determined that, in this case, controlled pairs were appropriate utilized due to their efficacy.

Additionally, the UOFRB noted Coleman's actions of firing not one but seven times at Officer Bravo demonstrated that Coleman was aggressively attacking the officers.

Based on a preponderance of evidence and totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and the Chief concurred, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer Bravo, would reasonably believe Coleman's actions presented

⁶⁰ *Id.*, Page 11, Lines 14- 25 and Page 12, Lines 1-4.

⁶¹ *Id.*, Page 20, Lines 13-25, and Page 21, Line 1; Page 23, Lines 22-24.

⁶² *Id.*, Page 12, Lines 4-7.

an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and that the use of lethal force would be objectively reasonable.

Officer Carbajal – .40 caliber, one round, in a southerly direction from an approximate distance of 38 feet.

According to Officer Carbajal, when Coleman began shooting, he stated it sounded like rapid fire from different weapons, but he could only see the muzzle flash of Coleman's firearm. Officer Carbajal was unsure if Coleman was utilizing multiple firearms due to the sound of Coleman's firearm being different from Officer Carbajal's service pistol. Officer Carbajal was in fear for his life and the lives of his partners. Officer Carbajal also considered the community members in the area. Officer Carbajal believed Coleman had no remorse or regard for human life. Officer Carbajal was in a position of cover behind a vehicle parked near the west sidewalk, north of Coleman. Officer Carbajal focused on Coleman from that position. Officer Carbajal placed his finger on the trigger of his service pistol and fired one round while simultaneously, Coleman was firing at Officer Carbajal and his partner officers. Officer Carbajal fired in a southerly direction as he was aiming at Coleman. Officer Carbajal, after firing his first round at Coleman, pressed the trigger of his service pistol a second time to fire again and felt that he had a spongy trigger. Officer Carbajal recognized his service pistol had a malfunction, cleared the malfunction, and looked up. Officer Carbajal observed Coleman running away southbound and out of sight. Officer Carbajal determined the shooting had stopped. Officer Carbajal believed the total rounds fired by Coleman were approximately five to seven but was unsure if was counting the shots from Coleman or from his partner officers.

Officer Carbajal recalled, *When he started shooting at us, it sounded rapid fire. It was loud, you know, and immediately my partners and I returned fire. But I know it was louder and it was kind of rapid, you know, how I perceived...It sounded louder, so I don't know if it was a 40... It sounded more like it was different weapons because of the rapid fire, I think. You know, I could hear my partners' shots being fired. I know that I'm at a close proximity to them, which is louder. But the shots that he's firing at us are louder and rapid. So I don't know if he had multiple guns or what was the reason of why it sounded like that to me, but it did sound different than our weapons.*⁶³

*I could only see the muzzle flash.*⁶⁴ *Just I was in fear for my life, fear for my partners' lives. You know, the community -- I knew there was kids out there. You know, this individual shooting at us, no remorse to, you know, human life or us.*⁶⁵

⁶³ Carbajal, Page 39, Lines 1-5, 10-11, and 17-25.

⁶⁴ *Id.*, Page 37, Lines 1-2.

⁶⁵ *Id.*, Page 41, Lines 37.

I know that I made -- I made eye contact with him. And I can immediately see that further movement from his hand coming up, and immediately I could see the muzzle flash. He is -- I do remember seeing him walking in a -- backpedaling, I want to say, and shooting at us.⁶⁶

I was able to focus on him, finger on my trigger, and I shot one round in his direction as he was shooting at us.⁶⁷ I was firing southbound direction, aiming at the suspect... Approximately 200 feet maybe, maybe less. I'm not 100 percent sure.⁶⁸

So when I pressed the second time, I could feel the spongy trigger. You know, my training and my muscle memory, I immediately looked at my guy could see that there's a round in the chamber, but my slide -- the slide is not fully forward, I guess. So I do the tap, rack, and, you know, (Unintelligible) I can't even use the right verbiage.⁶⁹ My -- the first shot that I shot, the shell casing ejected, but the second round didn't feed into the chamber. So I tapped it and I could see that -- immediately feel and see that my gun was back in service.⁷⁰

Immediately after that I tried to press the trigger again and I had a spongy trigger. I guess my training kicked in. I immediately looked at my gun. I tap racked and I hit the top of the slide and I noticed that I had a mis-fed.⁷¹ I fixed my malfunction and I came back on target and, you know, saw the suspect was no longer in sight or, you know, shooting at us.⁷²

By that time I look up and try to see if the suspect is in sight, and I can see the suspect running away southbound and out of sight. I no longer could see that, you know, he's shooting at us. The shooting has stopped.⁷³

When I gave my statement, I think I said approximately five to seven. I don't know if I counted his shots and then the shots from my partners.⁷⁴

The UOFRB noted that while attempting to exit his vehicle, Officer Carbajal was presented with a deadly threat. Officer Carbajal returned fire and, after one round,

⁶⁶ *Id.*, Page 38, Lines 9- 14.

⁶⁷ *Id.*, Page 18, Lines 18-21.

⁶⁸ *Id.*, Page 36, Lines 5-6 and 9-10.

⁶⁹ *Id.*, Page 29, Lines 23-25 and Page 30, Lines 1-4.

⁷⁰ *Id.*, Page 19, Lines 1-5.

⁷¹ *Id.*, Page 18, Lines 22-25, Page 19, Line 1.

⁷² *Id.*, Page 30, Lines 6-8.

⁷³ *Id.*, Page 19, Lines 6-10

⁷⁴ *Id.*, Page 38, Lines 18-21

discovered he had a malfunction determined to be an out of battery service pistol. Officer Carbajal's reverted to his department firearms training and quickly cleared the malfunction, assessing the scene again. The UOFRB noted Coleman's aggressive actions of firing approximately seven times at Officer Bravo. The UOFRB also noted that Officer Carbajal, in response to the imminent deadly threat, discharged one round from his service pistol. Officer Carbajal assessed again after he cleared the malfunction, and ceased fire as he observed Coleman was out of his sight.

Based on a preponderance of evidence and totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and the Chief concurred, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer Carbajal, would reasonably believe Coleman's actions presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and that the use of lethal force would be objectively reasonable.

Therefore, the Chief found Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal's use of lethal force to be In Policy, No Further Action.

Additional/Equipment

- **BWV** – Officer Meraz' BWV was powered on during the OIS and had the appropriate two-minute pre-activation buffer. However, Officer Meraz activated his BWV after the OIS had already occurred. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain R. Stabile, Serial No. 26260, Commander Officer, Hollenbeck Area, who noted Officer Meraz activated his BWV after the OIS due to being fired upon. The dynamic and quick escalation of the incident necessitated Officer Meraz to immediately respond to a deadly threat and Officer Meraz activated as soon as it was reasonable to do so. Captain Stabile advised the issue would be addressed through the generation of a Supervisory Action Item (SAI) and the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet. The Commanding Officer of Operations – Central Bureau (OCB) and the Director of the Office of Operations (OO) concurred with this action. As such, the Chief deemed no further action is necessary.

The Office of Operations conducted a random inspection of BWVs associated to Officer Meraz from May 11, 2019 through June 11, 2019, for compliance with BWV policy specific to complete recordings of investigative or enforcement contacts with the public. The results of the inspection indicated Officer Meraz had no prior deviations.

Officer Bravo's BWV device was powered off, prior to the OIS, as he was enroute from Hollenbeck CPS to the area of 1st Street and Gless Street. Officer Bravo powered on his BWV at 2138:46 hours, prior to the OIS occurring, and activated his BWV device late, at 2139:16 hours, after the OIS, resulting in a thirty second buffer. These issues were brought to the attention of Captain Stabile who advised the issue would be addressed through the generation of a Supervisory Action Item (SAI) and the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet. Commanding Officer OCB and the

Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, the Chief deemed no further action is necessary.

The Office of Operations conducted a random inspection of BWVs associated to Officer Bravo from May 11, 2019 through July 11, 2019, for compliance with BWV policy specific to complete recordings of investigative or enforcement contacts with the public. The results of the inspection revealed that Officer Bravo had one previous deviation from the two-minute pre-activation buffer requirement. This issue was brought to the attention of Assistant Chief R. Arcos, Serial No. 26185, who recommended the issuance of a Notice to Correct Deficiencies (NTC). As such, the Chief deemed no further action is necessary.

Officer Carbajal's BWV device was powered off, prior to the OIS, as he was driving to the area of 1st Street and Gless Street. Officer Carbajal powered on his BWV at 2139:18. Officer Carbajal activated his BWV device late, at 2140:26 hours, after the OIS, resulting in a short buffer time of one minute, eight seconds. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Stabile who advised that the issues would be addressed through divisional training. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with these actions. As such, the Chief deemed no further action is necessary.

The Office of Operations conducted a random inspection of BWVs associated to Officer Carbajal from May 11, 2019 through June 11, 2019, for compliance with BWV policy specific to complete recordings of investigative or enforcement contacts with the public. The results of the inspection revealed that Officer Carbajal had one previous late activation. This issue was brought to the attention of Assistant Chief Arcos who recommended the issuance of an NTC. As such, the Chief deemed no further action is necessary.

Sergeant Covarrubias's BWV device was powered off while at the Hollenbeck CPS completing administrative duties. Sergeant Covarrubias powered on and activated his BWV device while responding to the OIS, resulting in a less than two-minute pre-activation buffer. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Stabile who advised that this issue would be addressed through the generation of a SAI and the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, the Chief deemed no further action is necessary.

The Office of Operations conducted a random inspection of BWVs associated to Sergeant Covarrubias from May 11, 2019 through June 11, 2019 for compliance with BWV policy specific to complete recordings of investigative or enforcement contacts with the public. The results of the inspection revealed that Sergeant Covarrubias had two previous deviations from the two-minute pre-activation buffer requirement. This issue was brought to the attention of Assistant Chief Arcos who recommended the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet. As such, the Chief deemed no further action is necessary.

Sergeant Grant's BWV device appeared to be powered on while responding to the OIS. Sergeant Grant activated her BWV while driving from the Hollenbeck CPS in her police vehicle, and responding to the OIS location, the BWV did not have a full two-minute pre-activation buffer indicating that it had been previously powered down. Sergeant Grant also powered down her BWV while on-scene during the incident. The powering down issue was brought to the attention of Captain Stabile who advised this issue would be addressed through the generation of an SAI and the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, the Chief deemed no further action is necessary.

The Office of Operations conducted a random inspection of BWVs associated to Sergeant Grant from May 11, 2019 through June 11, 2019, for compliance with BWV policy specific to complete recordings of investigative or enforcement contacts with the public. The results of the inspection indicated Sergeant Grant had no prior deviations.

Detective Chavarria instructed Officer Bravo to record his PSS on BWV. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Stabile who advised that it will be addressed with informal counseling with Detective Chavarria. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, the Chief deemed no further action is necessary.

- **Driving While Maintaining Control of Service Pistol** – Officer Mott, while driving his police vehicle and responding to the help call, drew his service pistol. Officer Mott continued driving with his service pistol drawn and held in his right hand. Officer Mott's BWV appeared to show the muzzle of his service pistol momentarily covering Officer Mott's left arm as he maneuvered his steering wheel while driving. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Stabile who advised that Officer Mott will attend divisional training regarding this issue. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, the Chief deemed no further action is necessary.⁷⁵
- **Profanity** – Officer Mott utilized profanity while standing at his police vehicle while maintaining a portion of the perimeter. No pedestrians or occupied vehicles were nearby at the time. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Stabile who advised that it will be addressed with informal counseling. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, the Chief deemed no further action is necessary.
- **Basic Firearms Safety Rules** – Officer Mott, believing that the Coleman may have been inside of a vehicle was driving away from the perimeter, pointed his service pistol at the vehicle as it turned onto 4th Street from Gless Street and the muzzle of

⁷⁵ Officer Mott was not evaluated for Drawing and Exhibiting during this incident as his response was after the OIS occurred. Officer Mott was not included in the tactical aspects of this incident.

his service pistol may have come close to his partner officer, Officer Malone. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Stabile who reviewed the BWV footage and noted that due to the circumstances of the incident, Officer Mott's actions would have been reasonable. In order to enhance future performance, Captain Stabile advised that Officer Mott will attend divisional training regarding these subjects. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, the Chief deemed no further action is necessary.

- **Situational Awareness** – Officer Mott was holding the perimeter with his partner, Officer Malone. Officers Mott and Malone approached a vehicle near the perimeter to check for Coleman. Officer Mott, after observing Coleman was not inside of the vehicle, walked away with his back turned to the vehicle and its occupants. Officer Mott did so as Officer Malone was still speaking with the driver of the vehicle at the driver side door. Officer Mott is reminded of the importance of maintaining situational awareness of his partner officer and of any potential danger. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Stabile who advised that Officer Mott will attend divisional training regarding these issues. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, the Chief deemed no further action is necessary.
- **Notifications** – Sergeant Arangure notified the DOC at 2250 hours. The OIS and the subsequent help call broadcast had occurred at approximately 2139 hours. The notification was made approximately one hour and fifty-one minutes after the OIS and help call broadcast. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Stabile, who advised that this issue will be addressed with divisional training. The Commanding Officer OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, the Chief deemed no further action is necessary.

Audio/Video Recordings

- **Body Worn Video (BWV)** – Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal's had BWV devices which recorded the OIS. However, the BWV recordings did not capture sound until after the OIS occurred. Sergeants Covarrubias and Grant, as well as responding Officers Mott and Malone, recorded their responses to the OIS and their subsequent duties.
- **Outside Video** – Force Investigation Division investigators obtained outside video from two locations. Dolores Mission School, 170 Gless Street, had three cameras at the property. No footage of the OIS was captured. Additional footage from the second location, Boca Factory, 1605 East 1st Street, captured Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal stopping on Gless Street just prior to the OIS. However, the footage was not clear due to distance.
- **Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS)** – No DICVS from responding units contained footage of the OIS.

Chief's Direction

- The UOFRB noted that during this incident, an officer drew his service pistol while driving to the perimeter near the OIS location. The Chief directed the Director of the Office of Support Services (OSS) to conduct a review of Department training standards and issue a reminder to all Department personnel of the dangers and restrictions associated with the drawing of a service pistol while conducting vehicle operations.

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INSPECTOR GENERAL REVIEW

Inspector General Analysis

Investigation Quality

- No significant issues of concern were identified in relation to investigation quality.

Training Issues

- No significant issues of concern were identified in relation to training.

Equipment Issues

- No significant issues of concern were identified in relation to equipment.

Detention

- The OIG concurs with the Chief's analysis.

Tactical De-Escalation

- The OIG concurs with the Chief's analysis.

BWV and DICVS Policy Compliance

SERIAL	NAME	TIMELY BWV ACTIVATION	FULL 2- MINUTE BUFFER	BWV RECORDING OF ENTIRE INCIDENT	TIMELY DICVS ACTIVATION	DICVS RECORDING OF ENTIRE INCIDENT
35443	Sergeant Jose Covarrubias	Yes	No	Yes	N/A	N/A
34715	Sergeant Dana Grant	Yes	No	No	N/A	N/A
39480	Officer Jose Carbajal	No	No	No	N/A	N/A
42991	Officer Michael Meraz	No	Yes	No	N/A	N/A
36154	Officer Mark Bravo	No	No	No	N/A	N/A

Inspector General Recommendations

Tactics

- The OIG concurs with the Chief's findings.

Drawing/Exhibiting

- The OIG concurs with the Chief's findings.

Lethal Use of Force

- The OIG concurs with the Chief's findings.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "M. P. Smith". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "M." followed by a period and the last name "Smith" in a more prominent, slightly larger script.

MARK P. SMITH
Inspector General